

The G20's Future¹

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Abstract

The Group of Twenty (G20) was created at the ministerial level in response to the global financial crisis that erupted from Asia in 1997, and then at the leaders' level after the greater crisis from the United States in 2008. These crises called into question the core principles and practices of the dominant liberal order and its core international institutions, based on economic, social and political openness, developed since 1944. The G20 combined all established and emerging countries with high capability and connectivity to operate as equals to fulfill its dual distinctive foundational mission of promoting financial stability and making globalization work for all. Since its first summit in 2008 its performance spiked at Hamburg, Germany in 2017 and remained solid at Buenos Aires in 2018. These latter summits coped well with the new populist, protectionist U.S. president and a UK prime minister withdrawing her country from the European Union. G20-supported initiatives for rules-based open trade, climate change control and security were advanced. No other global summit emerged to govern an increasingly globalized world. With the forces that propelled this rising performance growing, future G20 summits promise to perform well along this proven path. The next summit, in Osaka, Japan on 28–29 July 2019 will be hosted by a country that has never sparked a financial crisis, remains dedicated to the core liberal order and is becoming more economically and even demographically open in response to the growing vulnerabilities it and its G20 partners face. After a test in 2020 when the G20 summit will be hosted in Saudi Arabia – a still-closed polity with a single staple, state-controlled economy – G20 stewardship returns to democratic, economically open Italy in 2021 and India in 2022.

Key words: G20; world order; global governance; globalization; trade; climate change

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Introduction

The Challenge

At the United Nations (UN) in late September 2018, U.S. president Donald Trump outlined his vision of a new world order that rejected “globalism” and put “patriotism” in its place. In sharp contrast, China’s foreign minister, echoing President Xi Jinping’s earlier speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, affirmed the core principles of the established liberal economic order that had been progressively established by the largely western powers led by the U.S. after their victory in World War II [Ikenberry, 2001].

These contrasting visions arose again when Presidents Trump and Xi met at the Group of Twenty (G20) summit in Argentina in late 2018. They and their G20 colleagues confronted the many challenges to the established order from an escalating U.S.-China trade war, financial crises from Argentina and prospectively elsewhere, a United Kingdom leaving the Euro-

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pean Union (EU), growing inequality, populism and protectionism across a declining Atlantic world, rising Asian rivals, and the existential threats of nuclear proliferation and, above all, climate change. Few expected such a divided summit to reinforce the established liberal order and reform it in the needed inclusive ways. But it substantially did. Yet the prevailing pessimism about future G20 governance soon returned as preparations began for the forthcoming summit in Osaka, Japan on 27–29 June 2019.

The Debate

Pessimism about the G20's future flowed easily from the dominant view of how G20 summits had performed in the past and predictions about how they would perform in the future.

One school sees the G20 as destined to decline or disappear following the great global financial crisis of 2008 that catalyzed its birth, as power shifted from the Group of 7 (G7) to the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and as the G20 agenda expanded beyond its proper finance and economic core [Patrick, 2014; Engelbrekt, 2015]. This school has recently been fuelled by complaints about emerging market instability from unilateral U.S. monetary policy and the assault on open trade and multilateral cooperation by U.S. president Donald Trump. Tom Chodor [2017, p. 205] more broadly highlighted G20 gridlock and fragmentation due to the 2008 global financial crisis “accelerating the shift of economic power from the North to the South, and...undermining the hegemony of neoliberalism in the South.”

A second school more specifically sees disappointing delivery due to the absence of a great crisis as in 2008–09. Adherents point to G20 members' failure to implement the 2010 summit promises on fiscal consolidation and banking capital, the failure to implement the Seoul summit commitment on International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank voice and vote reform and on other issues in later years [Callaghan, Sainsbury 2015].

A third school argues that the G20 system did work in its central role of controlling the financial crisis through to the Toronto summit in 2010 [Drezner, 2015]. It is, however, silent or sceptical about how the G20 performed without a financial crisis, beyond its strong success in its core financial regulation field [Kirton, 2014]. It does not address the disappointments at the 2014 Brisbane summit, as severe geopolitical risks arose from a militarily expansionist Russia and Islamic State terrorists [Ibid.].

A fourth school sees increasing effectiveness in global governance as the G20 system becomes a global steering committee across its broader, longer-term, more difficult and ambitious agenda. J. Kirton [2013; 2014] explains this G20 expansion into a global steering committee by using his “systemic hub model” according to which shock-activated vulnerability led in turn to multilateral organizational failure, and the predominant equalizing capability enabling G20 countries to respond, when their countries have converging characteristics, their leaders have high domestic political cohesion, and see the G20 as a cherished club at the hub of a network of global summit governance. J. Luckhurst [2016] similarly sees substantial sustained performance but, using constructivist theory, highlights how the global financial crisis created relatively rising capabilities for the emerging power members, enabling them to normatively contest the prevailing G7 principles and construct a new set of norms for macro-prudential regulation and selective capital account controls. After the 2017 Hamburg summit, D. Snower [2017] sees substantial, and in some respects, historic success.

The debate now focuses on whether the G20 has reinforced or reformed the established liberal order through the leadership of the largely western powers at its core. Six schools of thought stand out.

The first sees retreat in a “G zero” world. Here neither the G20 nor the “G2” comprised of the U.S. and China can govern soaring economic, ecological or geopolitical challenges and conflicts [Bremmer, Roubini, 2011].

The second school sees de-liberalizing reform. It argues that the G20, pushed by the BRICS and above all by a rising China, challenges “the EU based approach to the global order, rooted in effective multilateralism... with respect for core European values, including issues such as the rule of law and human rights” [van Kerckhoven, 2018, p. 70].

The third school sees strained, status quo reinforcement. Here the G20 still largely sustains the old western-based oligarchy and its traditional liberal values, while failing to protect the workers and even the long-standing compromise of embedded liberalism [Cooper, Pouliot, 2015; Naylor, 2019; Polaski, 2018; Ruggie, 1993].

The fourth school sees G20 decline. The G20 is “weakened, questioned and fractured,” due most recently to Trump’s assault on multilateralism, the rising populist distrust of elites, and above all the G20’s pursuit of the wrong policy model [Nahon, 2018, p. 49]. Yet this provides an historic opportunity for the G20 to shift to an alternative paradigm privileging sustainable development and equality among peoples [Nahon, Polaski, 2017].

The fifth school sees successful status quo liberal reinforcement. J. Ikenberry [2011, p. 136] argues that “leading states, most of them advanced liberal democracies... are engaged in a continuous process of give and take... in which multiple states take the lead or operate in concert... The so-called G7/G8 process – and the more recent G20 process – are emblematic of this open style of multiple and expandable governance.” He adds: “The liberal order also provides space within for shared leadership... Japan, for example, found these opportunities as it joined the... G20 leadership grouping” [2011, p. 340].

The sixth school sees progressive reinforcement. Here the G20 effectively strengthens an open liberal order by improving inclusiveness and equality in both the traditional field of macro-economic policy and the emerging area of digitalization [Prilepskiy, 2018; Kirton, Warren, 2018]. D. Bradlow [2018, p. 227] adds that, while global economic and financial governance – with the IMF and World Bank at the core – is not performing effectively, opportunities for limited but meaningful reform can and should “easily be exploited by entities like the BRICS and the G20.”

Thesis

This article argues that the G20 is increasingly if incompletely and slowly shaping a more inclusive, liberal world order to make globalization work for the benefit of all. Since its establishment in 1999, the G20 has responded to several financial crises, notably in 1997–1999, 2008–2009 and 2010–2012, and to the economic and political crises of confidence in the liberal order that they created. It has faithfully and effectively promoted financial stability and slowly made globalization work for more people in several ways. It has done so by operating as a well-designed club of leading established and emerging, intensely interconnected and equally vulnerable countries, any of which could suddenly need the others’ help.

More specifically, G20 summit performance rose from its 2008 start at Washington DC to surge at Hangzhou in 2016, soar at Hamburg in 2017 and remain solid at Buenos Aires in late 2018, despite the political stress test imposed by the populist, protectionist, parochial U.S. president Donald Trump. The G20 increasingly fostered new free trade agreements and broadened its agenda to advance social sustainability, climate change control and global security. No serious rival global governance group emerged to challenge the G20 leaders’ 2009 choice of the G20 as the primary permanent forum for their international economic cooperation. The forces that propelled this performance will strengthen, starting at Japan’s Asian summit in Osaka on

28–29 June 2019. While a test will come in 2020 with Saudi Arabia – a still-closed polity with a single staple, state-controlled economy – as host, G20 custodianship will return to democratic, economically open hosts, with summits to be held in Italy in 2021, India in 2022 and prospectively Indonesia in 2023.

This argument and analysis makes an original contribution to the G20 literature, including that by the author, by reconsidering existing assessments of the G20's future in light of several recent key developments [Kirton 2015; 2016a; 2016b; 2017d]. The first is the compliance by members with their commitments made at the high-performing 2017 Hamburg summit, which was the first G20 summit that the Republican President Trump attended. The second is the impact of the U.S. midterm elections on 8 November 2018, which gave control of the U.S. House of Representatives to the opposition Democratic Party and which could thus impose a constraint on Trump's unilateralist international approach. The third is the success of the G20's Buenos Aires summit on 30 November – 1 December 2018, which was greater than many had predicted. The fourth is the set of conflicting trends in trade protectionism. At Buenos Aires, Trump signed a revised North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico, declared a truce on tariff escalations against China until 1 March, and then watched his NAFTA partners sign the Comprehensive Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) with Japan while the latter signed a free trade deal with the EU. Yet the process of Britain's "Brexit" from the EU soon entered its final weeks with no deal for a smooth transition in sight. The fifth development is related to Japan's plan and preparations for the G20 Osaka summit, where trade and many other central issues requiring global cooperation had a central role.

This article examines the implications of these developments for the G20's future by reviewing: first, how the G20 and the earlier G7 have coped with similar severe assaults on the inherited multilateral liberal order since 1971; second, the G20's distinctive design to meet 21st century versions of such assaults; third, the G20 summit's rising performance through to its Hamburg peak with Trump present; fourth, the 2018 Buenos Aires summit's solid liberal success; fifth, the G20's advances on the critical issues of trade, security and climate change; sixth, the propellers of this strengthening performance; and seventh, the prospects and potential for the Osaka summit and the G20 beyond.

Controlling Globalized Crises Since 1971

Global financial and other crises have proliferated since 15 August 1971, when a once victorious, hegemonic United States, soon to be militarily vanquished in Vietnam, unilaterally assaulted the liberal, open, rules-based, multilateral monetary and trade order that it had pioneered since 1944. Its "Nixon shock" and the subsequent bankruptcy of New York City catalyzed the creation of the G7 summit of major democratic powers in 1975. Then a new, non-state, non-targeted, more global financial crisis arising from Asia in 1997 spurred the finance ministers of Canada and the United States in 1999 to establish the G20 for the finance ministers and central bank governors of a new class of systemically significant states. Soon after, the deadly terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 made the G20 an effective global security governor, starting with the compelling issue of stopping the financing of terrorism. This helped bond the new U.S. administration of Republican George W. Bush to the group. Bush later chose the G20 as the summit to address the much larger American-turned-global financial crisis erupting in New York City on 15 September 2008. The G20 moved from a crisis response to a crisis prevention body at its Canadian- and Korean-hosted summits in 2010, its French-hosted summit in 2011 and its Mexican-hosted summit in 2012, which helped stop the new European financial crisis from going global. This G20 summit success in producing financial stability has endured, despite the country-contained financial crisis in Argentina in 2018.

Conquering Crises of Confidence in the Liberal Order Since 1971

Each of these physical financial crises created a psychological and political crisis of confidence in the 1944 liberal multilateral order based on the open economies, societies and polities of the victors (beyond the Soviet Union). This order was backed by the principles of democracy, human rights and an “embedded liberalism” that nationally protected citizens within their still largely closed sovereign states from international forces [Ruggie, 1993]. When increasing interdependence, then globalization and its crises, made such states and their citizens much more globally exposed, the G7 and its G20 successor responded just enough, just in time to enable the evolving liberal order to survive and thrive, especially after the democratic revolution went global with the Cold War victory in 1989 [Patrick, 2014].

The psychological and political crises of confidence first arose amidst the stagflation of the 1970s and the deep global recession of 1980–85, with which an often divided democratic world struggled to cope. The 1997 financial crises that devastated the emerging Asian economies of Thailand, Indonesia and Korea, followed by Russia and Brazil and which even threatened the United States, challenged the rising, if never dominant, free market fundamentalism of the so-called Washington Consensus and its devotees in the IMF. Yet in 1999 the Group of Eight (G8) summit (comprised of the G7 and now Russia), responded with the “Cologne Consensus” on socially sustainable globalization. Its key principles became the two distinctive missions of the “finance G20” created that year. The much bigger 2008 crisis bred calls for a “new Bretton Woods” order. Yet in practice it brought a G20 summit that successfully focused on restoring financial stability through a new macro-prudential approach and macroeconomic growth through orthodox Keynesian tools [Drezner, 2015; Luckhurst, 2016].

Designing a Distinctive Mission, Membership and Reversing Roles

Once the G20 summit had fulfilled its first mission of producing global financial stability, it turned to its second mission of making globalization work for all. Both missions united the G20’s established and emerging economies, each made systemically significant by their combined capability, connectivity and thus vulnerability in a globalized world. The crises from the United States in 2008 and Europe in 2010 had brought a great role reversal – the major providers of financial security in the Mexican peso crisis of 1994 and the Asian-turned-global financial crisis of 1997 became the leading consumers of financial security, needing bailouts from those that had been afflicted before. China, Japan, India, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa had no home-grown financial crisis in either phase, but still suffered from the contagion and thus contributed to its control. Some of these countries, burdened by growing debt, could catalyze crises in the years ahead.

Rising Performance Through to Hamburg’s Surge, 2008–17

After the great role reversal of 2008, G20 summit performance steadily rose across all key dimensions of governance that international institutions have (see Appendix A).

On the first dimension, domestic political management, very busy G20 leaders almost always took time to attend the G20 summit to help them manage their policy and politics back home. Their perfect attendance at the first three summits did then decline to 90%, where it stabilized for the next seven. It then rose to 95% at Hangzhou in 2016 and Hamburg in 2017 before dipping again to 90% at Buenos Aires in 2018.

In its public deliberation, the collective conclusions encoded in the G20’s summits’ concluding communiqués steadily expanded. There was often considerable political struggle to

agree on the words in these texts and recently there have even been doubts that a full consensus communiqué could be produced. Yet it always was. The number of words they contained rose from 3,567 in 2008 to 28,766 in 2013, then plunged to 5,983 in 2015, but soared to a new high of 34,746 in 2017. The drop to 13,515 words at Buenos Aires in 2018 was still the eighth-highest of the 13 summits to date. Even more meaningful, if much more difficult to discover and systematically measure, are the leaders' private conversations at the summit, both collectively in the full summit sessions and more selectively in the many smaller groups of bilateral meetings and encounters they have off the summit site. The collective entirely private conversation among leaders alone during their dinner at the St. Petersburg summit in September 2013 helped stop Syria's President Assad from using chemical weapons of mass destruction as a routine weapon of war for the next few years. Still, the public communiqués are essential for fostering, rendering more precise and publicly embedding the principles and commitments upon which the leaders agree.

In its principled and normative direction setting, the number of G20 affirmations of their first foundational mission of financial stability was surpassed since 2013 by those of its second foundational mission of inclusive globalization for all. More surprisingly, there was strong evidence of G20 support for a liberal world order in the political as well as economic and social domains. Communiqué affirmations of the principles of democracy were substantial. Those of individual liberty and human rights rose in 2016 and 2017 and remained present in 2018.

In its decision-making, the G20's public, collective, precise, future-oriented, politically binding commitments expanded rather steadily, from 95 in 2008 at Washington to 213 in 2016 and 529 in 2017. They fell to a still substantial 128 in 2018, a total that was higher than seven of the previous 12 summits had produced.

In the delivery of these decisions, through members' compliance with their priority commitments before the subsequent summit, compliance has averaged just over 70%. To the fundamental question of whether sovereign states in an international structure of anarchy keep their international commitments, the evidence shows that most countries do keep the most important commitments they make in their leaders' G20 club. Compliance is assessed by giving each G20 members' implementing behaviour, on each priority commitment, a score +1 for full compliance, 0 for partial compliance, or -1 for no compliance or antithetical behaviour, and then converting the resulting averages on the scientific scale with a 200 point range, from -100 to +100, to a popular percentage score of the more familiar 100 point scale from 0 to +100 [Kirton, Larionova, 2018]. Such careful analysis shows that the average compliance from each summit was always positive. It was only 57% with London in 2009 but at least 67% for all other summits. It reached a new high of 87% for Hamburg in 2017.

In the institutionalized development of global governance inside the G20, the number of ministerial forums the G20 created expanded since 2010 (see Appendix B-1). It started with only finance ministers and central bank governors in 2008, but expanded to six by 2017 – adding labour, agriculture, foreign affairs, digitalization and health, and having ad hoc ministerial meetings for tourism, development, trade and energy. Its official-level working or study groups, started with four in 2008 and expanded to 13 in 2018, including ones for infrastructure, education and women business leaders (see Appendix B-2). Civil society engagement groups arose formally in 2010 and expanded to nine by 2017 (see Appendix B-3). In the development of global governance institutions outside the G20, the number of G20 references and thus guidance rose rather steadily to 237 at Seoul and St. Petersburg, before a plunge to 45 at Brisbane. The number of different institutions referenced followed a similar path.

The 2017 Hamburg summit brought new highs in performance, despite the presence for the first time of a populist, protectionist Donald Trump, who had just announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change [Kirton, 2017c]. G20 leaders, hosted

by Germany and led by Chancellor Angela Merkel, were able to advance cooperation on terrorism, North Korea, women's economic empowerment, the marine environment and much else. All but the U.S. acted collectively to control climate change. The summit's highly inclusive liberal message expanded the 1940s compromise of embedded liberalism by declaring that the economy should serve society, not the other way around [Ruggie, 1993; Snower, 2017].

The 2018 Buenos Aires Summit's Solid Liberal Success

G20 support for a progressive, inclusive, liberal world order was sustained by Argentina's Buenos Aires summit in 2018 [Kirton, Koch, 2018]. Argentine president Mauricio Macri began his year as host by setting the summit theme as "Building Consensus for Fair and Sustainable Development" and by calling the G20 "the world's preeminent forum for... political co-operation," committed "to fair and sustainable economic development that generates opportunities for everyone" [G20 Argentina 2018; 2017]. His foreign minister, Jorge Faurie, added: "Argentina's intelligent integration with the international community is based on our nation's key values: democracy, freedom and human rights." The seven guest countries Argentina invited to its summit were all democratic. The summit offered a broad agenda, led by Argentina's first priority of the future of work in the digital age, to promote inclusiveness and equality for all. It added the development-oriented priorities of infrastructure and food.

Argentina relied heavily on a bottom-up strategy according to which leaders would largely endorse the work and the many commitments of the lead-up G20 ministerial meetings for finance, foreign affairs, energy, agriculture, the digital economy, education and employment, trade and investment and health. These were enriched by input from the seven core civil society engagement groups: the Business 20 (B20), Labour 20 (L20), Think 20 (T20), Youth 20 (Y20), Civil 20 (C20), Women's 20 (W20) and Science 20 (S20).

On the summit's second day, the leaders' sherpas finally managed to produce a draft communiqué to recommend to their leaders for presentation at the end of the summit that afternoon. On the highly divisive, key issue of climate change, the draft reportedly contained a reference that showed no retreat from the language at Hamburg. Yet it remained for the leaders themselves to approve their sherpas' draft, during or after their morning working session on sustainable development, climate sustainability and climate change, or their working lunch on infrastructure and food security.

In the end, the Buenos Aires summit was a solid success, despite Argentina's position as the second-least powerful member of the G20 and its handicap of suffering a financial crisis and thus relying on an IMF support package during its year as host [Kirton, 2018]. The summit produced a consensus communiqué of almost seven pages and an accompanying action plan. In their private collective conversations and on-site bilaterals, the leaders directly addressed many key issues, including the most divisive economic, security and political ones.

The communiqué opened by heralding "a gender mainstreaming strategy across the G20 agenda." This put gender equality as the central principle of G20 governance for the first time. It was a significant step toward making globalization work for all, starting with the women and girls who constitute half of the people in the world.

The summit also agreed to further strengthen "the global financial safety net with a strong, quota-based, and adequately resourced IMF at the centre." This would give the IMF the resources to help the G20 promote financial stability should more countries require IMF support, as Argentina, with its \$57 billion package, just had.

On climate change, most had assumed that U.S. resistance would lead at best to only a short and general passage that might not even reference the Paris Agreement or the work of the United Nations. But communiqué paragraph 19, agreed to by all 20 members, stated: "We note

the latest IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5 degrees centigrade... We look forward to successful outcomes of the UNFCCC [United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change] COP24 [24th Conference of the Parties] and to engage in the Talanoa Dialogue.” Here Donald Trump acknowledged the value of the science behind, and the conclusions and recommendations of, this UN report and that 1.5°C alone was the new target, rather than the more lenient 2° one highlighted in the Paris Agreement. He further agreed to work when the Committee of the Parties (COP) 24 began to write the rule book to implement the Paris Agreement, even if the United States was withdrawing from it. And by engaging in the Talanoa Dialogue, G20 leaders implied that they might accept climate change control commitments more stringent than those in the Paris Agreement itself.

On trade, in two paragraphs, all leaders agreed to “support the necessary reform of the WTO (World Trade Organization) to improve its functioning. We will review progress at our next Summit.” To be sure, they did not include the standard anti-protectionist pledge to renounce imposing further restrictions and to roll back the ones they had recently introduced. But their commitment provided a basis on which to build.

Advancing Inclusiveness on Key Issues

This G20 consensus on socially sustainable globalization and its inclusive liberal order will continue in future years, even on the key divisive issues of trade, security and above all climate change.

Fostering New Free Trade Agreements

With the support of the G20, trade liberalization is surviving Trump’s severe stress test [Kirton, 2018]. Indeed, it is expanding despite the strengthening headwinds from him and a “Brexiting” Britain. The European Union has entered the North American market with its now ratified Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). It is also concluding one with Mexico, Canada’s partner in NAFTA. Canada has completed a bilateral free trade deal with Ukraine and is exploring or negotiating others with India, Japan, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) and the Pacific Alliance, among others. China is building the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was completed as the CPTPP 11 in November 2017, after Trump pulled the United States out, with Canada making it a more socially embedded liberal “comprehensive, progressive” TPP.

President Trump had long found few willing to deal with him through his preferred bilateral trade deals. To be sure, U.S. threats to end its free trade agreement with Korea ended when the two agreed to a modestly revised deal. Then in July 2018 the EU agreed to engage in bilateral talks. In September 2018, Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe did so too. Little progress has come from the EU and Japanese discussions. The G20 had managed the concerns of the U.S. and others about the steel trade until Trump imposed steel and aluminum tariffs on a wide array of G20 partners in 2018. In early October 2018, the U.S. agreed to a slightly revised NAFTA, now re-named the U.S., Mexico, Canada Agreement (USMCA) with progressive provisions to protect labour, the environment and women within. Trump’s U.S. has now moved to at least discuss trade liberalization in a progressive way with all its G7 partners within the G20 and with Korea and Mexico too.

There are thus good grounds to expect the G20 to become a stronger centre of global trade liberalization governance, in a way that the WTO cannot without the G20’s help. This was seen

in the critical, catalytic role played by the G20's Brisbane summit in 2014 in concluding the trade facilitation agreement that the WTO could not. More broadly, the G20 summits from 2008 to 2017 made 164 trade commitments, starting with five at Washington in 2008 and soaring to new highs of 24 at Hangzhou in 2016 and 29 at Hamburg in 2017 with Donald Trump there. Compliance by G20 members with their priority summit trade commitments was a positive 62%. Compliance with the assessed 2015 commitments from Antalya soared to 80% and those from 2016 at Hangzhou to 83%.

Compliance was higher with those commitments that did not refer to the WTO and in years where more G20 trade commitments were made. Compliance with the leaders' trade commitments was also higher in years where G20 meetings of trade ministers were held. These started in Mexico in 2012, and after an absence in 2013, continued in 2014, 2015 and 2016 but not 2017. G20 trade governance is thus effective, especially when it is directed at liberalization beyond the rigid confines of the WTO.

Strengthening Global Security Governance

This strengthening G20 success arose on security too [Kirton, 2017a]. The finance G20 flexibly first focused on terrorist finance in the aftermath of the deadly terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 11 September 2001 [Lee, 2010]. Since 2008, the G20 summit steadily became an effective global security governor over an expanded terrain. It moved from the non-state threats of terrorist finance, through money laundering, tax evasion, crime, corruption and terrorism as a whole, to the high, hard, state-initiated security threats of the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction in their chemical and nuclear forms. At St. Petersburg in 2013 it helped stop Syrian president Bashar al-Assad from routinely using chemical weapons, at least until U.S. president Barack Obama was replaced by Donald Trump after the presidential election of November 2016. In Hamburg in 2017, at the leaders-only opening session, Trump and his colleagues discussed North Korea's nuclear weapons proliferation. They appeared to come to a consensus that led to a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution to sanction North Korea, with UNSC permanent members China and Russia in support.

More broadly, meetings on the margins of G20 summits have had useful security effects. These ranged from the message on Iran's nuclear programme from Pittsburgh in 2009 to the discussions about and with Russian president Vladimir Putin over his moves in Ukraine in the preparations for and at Brisbane in 2014. Moreover, the G20 foreign ministers' meeting expanded in several ways, from its fragile beginning in Los Cabos, Mexico in 2012, to its long-planned gathering on the road to Hamburg in 2017.

Terrorism, as the G20's first security subject, will not go away. Nor will it be stopped by Trump's unilateral, border-closing approach in the United States, as seen by the deadly attacks in New York City in November and December 2017. The terrorist threat is well known to future G20 hosts. It has already touched Argentina, Japan in the 1995 sarin gas attacks and, above all, Saudi Arabia, which will host in 2020. Nuclear proliferation from North Korea and Iran will also preoccupy the latter two hosts.

Controlling Climate Change

On climate change several trends show some G20 success, even if the October 2018 IPCC report showed it was not nearly enough, with time fast running out [Kirton, Kokotsis, 2015]. From 2008 to 2016, G20 summits made 53 commitments on climate change. To be sure, members' compliance averaged a low 65% with the 22 commitments assessed. This was lower than

the G20's overall compliance average of 71% (across all 191 commitments assessed). And at Hangzhou, performance remained poor. Compliance with two climate and other energy commitments was low. Compliance with the commitment to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies ranked last, that on energy efficiency 14th and that on climate change 10th.

However at Hamburg, performance surged to a new high of 22 climate commitments and another 43 in the "G20 Hamburg Climate and Energy Action Plan for Growth." They came among the 529 commitments the leaders made overall. Compliance with the commitment on energy and energy efficiency was 80%, on climate resilience 83%, on waste reduction 90% and on sustainable energy 93%, for a new peak average of 87%. This matched the compliance across all subjects that also reached an unprecedented 87%.

At Buenos Aires leaders made 86 commitments in their communiqué, including four on climate change. Among the 16 subjects there, climate change ranked 10th. Energy, with six commitments, ranked fifth. The 10 climate and energy commitments together account for 12% of the total.

To raise their overall and climate change compliance, G20 leaders can use proven, low-cost accountability measures that they directly control [Kirton, Larionova, 2018]. Invoking international law (notably the UNFCCC), having a preparatory G20 finance ministers' meeting that references climate change and holding many pre-summit ministerial meetings seem to help [Ibid.].

Proliferating Propellers of Performance

The forces that propelled the G20's rising performance will grow. The shocks that activate the shared vulnerability of all G20 members and others will intensify to approach critical thresholds, led by the globally existential threats of climate change and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, followed by health, terrorism, territorial disputes, energy, ecology, migration and financial threats.

The continuing failure of the core multilateral organizations from the 1940s confirms that there is no place to go other than the G20, if only because those hard law organizations seldom reliably meet at the leaders' level to address all key challenges comprehensively and coherently for an intensely interconnected world. Trump's withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement on climate change, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the Global Compact on Migration compound the failure. In trade the WTO has not completed a multilateral trade negotiation round in over two decades and its appellate body will soon be made moribund by a U.S. president who rejects multilateral trade liberalization and refuses to appoint U.S. judges to the body. The IMF, with its unique U.S. veto, does better, but is unlikely to undertake on time the promised next round of voice and vote reform to give rising emerging powers their promised, proportionally enhanced place. The World Bank Group, its co-located and U.S.-headed twin, is more vulnerable to U.S. financial cutbacks for development, but did make an important step forward in spring 2018. With a new president about to be appointed, it is likely to give greater emphasis to traditional development than to sustainable development and climate change control.

G20 members will continue to possess a strong predominance of collective global capability. The Argentinian host had identified the G20's collective global capability on 30 November 2017 as 85% of global economic output, 80% of global investment, 75% of international trade and 66% of global population [IMF, 2017].

Members' internal equality will strengthen, as reviving growth in G7 members is outstripped by the levels of a slightly slowing China and India. A currently beleaguered Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Argentina, Turkey and others are likely largely to revive in the medium term.

Convergence on the common liberal principles of open economies, societies and polities provides a serious constraint in the political realm, with the current closure in Russia, Turkey and elsewhere. Yet there is offsetting openness, backed by action against corruption, in Argentina, Brazil and South Africa.

Political cohesion is problematic in the G7 powers of the United States, United Kingdom, Italy and even Germany, with populism on the rise. Yet cohesion should remain solid in Japan, France, Canada, China, India, Argentina and Russia. Moreover, across several key G20 countries there is broad popular support for multilateral cooperation in general and the G20 institution itself. In several key G20 countries, there was considerable public support for the G20 in 2018 [Tillman, 2018a; 2018b]. A poll of citizens in the U.S., UK, Germany, Russia and Argentina found that 83% expected “their governments to work together to solve global problems,” 58% would put their own countries’ interests aside if such cooperation would produce effective solutions benefiting all, 45% had a favourable opinion of the G20 and only 20% an unfavourable opinion and 74% said they had heard of the G20, even if 58% in the U.S. never had. On compliance with G20 commitments, one third favoured following the recommendations of the G20 regardless of their own national interests, one third were opposed and one third were uncertain. However media attention to the G20 was very low.

The experience since Seoul in 2010 suggests that the G20 will continue to slowly become a cherished interpersonal club at the hub of a growing network of global summit governance, with new spokes such as the Silk Road summit added all the time (see Appendix C).

The G20’s status as the hub is seen in the absence, after a decade, of any rival or replacement, with none emerging in the coming years. This is even after the G20 summit shrunk since 2011 from holding two to only one summit a year. The BRICS summit beginning in 2009 has largely worked in supportive partnership with the G20, especially by holding the BRICS second summit each year at the same time and place as the G20 one [Larionova, Kirton, 2018]. The BRICS has not expanded its small membership beyond adding South Africa in 2010. The older G7 has also worked together with the G20 in a synergistic partnership, including at the Canadian-hosted twin G8 and G20 summits in Muskoka and nearby Toronto on the same weekend in June 2010 [Kirton, 2017b; Larionova, Kirton, 2015]. The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation summit, the ASEAN summit and the East Asia summit continue at a steady pace. Chinese-pioneered Silk Road summitry has just started but remains a very specialized infrastructure-oriented process. Recently created specialized multilateral development banks such as the BRICS New Development Bank and the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank follow the path forged earlier by bodies such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Islamic Development Bank. To be sure, UN summitry has intensified. Yet it remains largely a subject-specific, siloed ad hoc addition, even with the more comprehensive sustainable development goals (SDGs) arriving in 2015.

Prospects and Potential for Osaka and Beyond

The future of the G20 and the inclusive, progressive liberal order it has strengthened should continue when the summit returns to Asia in 2019. Japan has never sparked a financial crisis, remains dedicated to the core liberal order and is increasingly becoming more economically and even demographically open in response to the growing vulnerabilities it and its G20 partners face. For Osaka it has set a broad agenda centred on the key issues of trade and climate change.

At the Buenos Aires summit Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe outlined in Japanese to his fellow leaders and the watching media and public, his seven priorities for Osaka. They were, first, promoting free trade; second, science and technology innovation to solve social problems

and foster a human-centred society with an emphasis on women, youth and people with disabilities; third, infrastructure for development; and fourth, global health.

The fifth priority was climate change. Abe said it was essential to enhance environmental and economic growth together, in part by creating a good circular economy-environment system, and having the private sector invest in it. This included acting against marine plastic pollution, supporting marine biodiversity and addressing energy. The sixth priority was aging populations. The seventh was promoting the SDGs and international development.

A more detailed set of priorities had been prepared by mid-November 2018 for the finance track. Its first theme was the global commons for shared growth, starting with engines for shared growth. The first component was quality infrastructure investment, the second universal health coverage and the third resilience against natural disasters.

To help Japan deliver this agenda, it scheduled eight ministerial meetings – four before the summit on agriculture, finance, trade and digital economy, and energy and environment, and four afterward on labour, health, tourism, and foreign affairs. The list included a G20 environment ministers meeting to be held jointly with energy ministers two weeks before the summit itself.

Yet the success of this approach and the Osaka summit overall depends on how host Japan works with neighbouring Korea and China, as experienced and successful summit hosts [Kirton, 2016a; 2016b]. All three countries are committed to trade liberalization, providing a basis for Northeast Asian regional unity. Most like-minded trade-liberalizing G20 members, including a Britain withdrawing from the EU, can build on this foundation. North Korea's nuclear proliferation and the campaign against corruption provide a further bond. This could make this summit another security success, which a newly vulnerable U.S. could easily support. Moreover, Chinese president Xi Jinping needs to extend his proclaimed liberal approach to the economy more vigorously to China's own financial system and society. Japan shares similar incentives and an aging population with Korea and China.

The biggest potential constraint to such cooperation is the intensification of regional territorial disputes. Yet the BRICS summit in Xiamen in September 2017 brought China and India back from the brink of their escalating territorial dispute. Moreover, the new vulnerability of an accidental, unauthorized or unintentional North Korean nuclear launch could help the clear, current and continuing danger transcend the traditional rivalry based on the relative capability brought by territory descended from the Westphalian world formed many centuries ago. Tipping the balance could be a shared interest in securing the oceanic “blue economy” for the benefit of all in Northeast Asia and far beyond against the compounding threat of climate change.

Beyond Osaka, the G20's future looks bright. To be sure, a test will come in 2020, when the G20 is scheduled to be hosted by Saudi Arabia, a still-closed polity with a single staple, state-controlled economy. Their representatives at Buenos Aires reportedly vetoed a summit affirmation of media freedom. However the G20 will then return to the democratic, economically open hosts of Italy in 2021 and India in 2022.

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Appendix A G20 Summit Performance, 2008–18

Grade	Domestic Political Management			Deliberation			Direction Setting			Decision-making		Delivery		Development of Global Governance				
	Attendance	# compliments	% members complimented	# days	# documents	# words	Stability	Inclusion	Democracy	Liberty	# commitments	Compliance	# assessed	Internal	Spread	# references	External	Spread
2008	A-	100%	0	0%	2	2	3,567	16	2	10	2	95	75%	0	4	39	11	
2009 L ^a	A	100%	1	5%	2	3	6,155	29	6	9	0	129	57%	7	12	4	120	27
2009 P ^b	A-	100%	0	0%	2	2	9,257	11	21	28	1	128	67%	15	47	4	115	26
2010 T ^c	A-	90%	8	15%	2	5	11,078	47	32	11	1	61	68%	15	71	4	164	27
2010 S ^d	B	95%	5	15%	2	5	15,776	66	36	18	4	153	67%	41	99	4	237	31
2011	B	95%	11	35%	2	3	14,107	42	8	22	0	282	74%	22	59	4	247	27
2012	A-	95%	6	15%	2	2	12,682	43	23	31	3	180	77%	19	65	4	138	20
2013	A	90%	15	55%	2	11	28,766	73	108	15	3	281	69%	24	190	4	237	27
2014	B	90%	10	40%	2	5	9,111	10	12	1	0	205	72%	26	39	4	42	12
2015	B	90%	0	0%	2	6	5,983	13	22	0	2	198	71%	23	42	4	54	11
2016	B+	95%	7	25%	2	4	16,004	11	29	34	5	213	73%	24	179	4	223	19
2017	B+	95%	0	0	2	10	34,746	42	61	2	11	529	87%	17	84	6	234	19
2018	B-	90%	0	0	2	2	13,515	23	53	7	2	128	78%	20	20	5	24	15
Total	N/A	N/A	63	N/A	23	60	180,747	426	413	188	34	2,582	N/A	261	907	N/A	1,874	272
Average	N/A	95%	4.85	19%	2	4.6	13,904	32.77	32	15	3	199	72%	20	70	4	144	21

Notes. ^a London; ^b Pittsburgh; ^c Toronto; ^d Seoul. N/A = not applicable. Only documents issued at a summit in the leaders' name are included.

Grade is based on a scoring scheme created by John Kirton, as follows: A+ Extremely Strong, A Very Strong, A- Strong, B+ Significant, B Substantial, B- Solid, C Small, D Very Small, F Failure (including made things worse). Available at: www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/scoring.html.

Domestic political management: participation by G20 members and at least one representative from the European Union and excludes invited countries; compliments are references to full members in summit documents.

Deliberation: duration of the summit and the documents collectively released in the leaders' name at the summit.

Direction setting: number of statements of fact, causation and rectitude relating directly to open democracy and individual liberty.

Decision-making: number of commitments as identified by the G20 Research Group.

Delivery: scores are measured on a scale from -1 (no compliance) to +1 (full compliance, or fulfillment of goals set out in the commitment). Figures are cumulative scores based on compliance reports.

Development of global governance: internal are references to G20 institutions in summit documents; external are references to institutions outside the G20; engagement groups are references to engagement groups. Spread indicates the number of different institutions mentioned. 2018 is core communiqué only.

Appendix B-1 Ministerial Meetings

Finance	1999–2017	2018, 2019
Employment and Labour	2010–17	2018 (with Education), 2019
Tourism	2010–13	–, 2019
Agriculture	2011, 2012, 2015–17	2018, 2019
Development	2011	–
Trade	2012, 2014–16	– (with digitalization) 2019
Foreign Affairs	2012, 2013, 2017	2018, 2019
Energy	2015, 2016	2018 (with Environment), 2019
Digitalization	2017	2018 (with Trade), 2019
Health	2017	2018, 2019
Environment		(with energy) 2019

Appendix B-2

G20 Working and Study Groups 2018

- Working Groups/Study Groups
- Finance track:
 - Framework Working Group
 - International Financial Working Group
 - Africa Advisory Group on Compact with Africa
 - Infrastructure Working Group (new)
- Sherpa track:
 - Anti-Corruption Working Group
 - Climate Change Study Group
 - Development Working Group
 - Digitalization
 - Education Working Group (new)
 - Employment Working Group
 - Steel Overcapacity Working Group
 - Trade and Investment Working Group
 - Women’s Business Leaders’ Taskforce (new)

Appendix B-3

Civil Society Engagement Groups

B20	Business	2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018
L20	Labour	2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018
Y20	Youth	2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018
C20	Civil	2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018
T20	Think Tanks	2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018
W20	Women	2015, 2016, 2017, 2018
S20	Science	2017, 2018
Informal:		
YES	Young Entrepreneurs’ Summit	2010–17
(G)20	Girls	2010–17
F20	Faith	

Appendix C

G20 Network Through Plurilateral Summit Institutions

	G8 ^a	MEM	Commonwealth	Francophonie	ASEM	OSCE	APEC	SOA	SCO	NATO	OIC	Total
Argentina								x				1
Australia		x	x				x					3
Brazil	x	x						x				3
Canada	x	x	x	x		x	x	x		x		8
China	x	x			x		x		x			5
France	x	x		x	x	x				x		6
Germany	x	x			x	x				x		5
India	x	x	x		x				x ^b			5
Indonesia		x			x		x				x	4
Italy	x	x			x	x				x		5
Japan	x	x			x		x					4
Korea		x			x		x					3
Mexico	x	x					x	x				4
Netherlands					x	x				x		3
Russia	x	x				x	x		x		x ^b	6
Saudi Arabia		x										1
South Africa	x	x	x									3
Spain					x	x				x		3
Turkey						x				x	x	3
United Kingdom	x	x	x		x	x				x		6
United States	x	x				x	x	x		x		6
European Union	x	x			x							3
Total	14	18	5	2	12	10	9	5	3	9	3	90

Notes. Includes plurilateral summit institutions of trans-regional reach containing members from the developed and emerging/developing world.

MEM = Major Economies Meeting; ASEM = Asia – European Union Meeting; OSCE = Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe; APEC = Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation; SOA = Summit of the Americas; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; SCO = Shanghai Cooperation Organisation; SOA = Summit of the Americas; OIC = Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

^a Includes Plus Five members.

Будущее «Группы двадцати»¹

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«Группа двадцати» была создана на уровне министров в ответ на глобальный экономический кризис, который произошел в Азии в 1997 г. С 2008 г., уже после нового кризиса, зародившегося в США, встречи «двадцатки» стали проводиться на уровне лидеров государств. Эти кризисы поставили под сомнение основные принципы доминирующего либерального порядка и легитимность обеспечивавших его распространение международных институтов, созданных после 1944 г. и основанных на экономической, социальной и политической открытости. «Группа двадцати» объединила все развитые и наиболее динамично развивающиеся страны с большим потенциалом и готовые к координации политики, чтобы действовать сообща и на равных для выполнения своей главной миссии – обеспечения финансовой стабильности и создания возможностей для использования преимуществ глобализации для всех. С первого саммита в 2008 г. «двадцатка» демонстрировала улучшающиеся показатели эффективности, максимум был достигнут по итогам саммита в Гамбурге в 2017 г., результаты остались стабильно высокими в Буэнос-Айресе в 2018 г. Последние саммиты продемонстрировали устойчивость института перед серьезными вызовами, особенно протекционистской политикой нового популистского президента США и премьер-министра Великобритании, который вывел свою страну из Европейского союза. Поддерживаемые «двадцаткой» инициативы в сферах свободной торговли, основанной на правилах ВТО, борьбы с изменением климата и безопасности получают развитие как на международном, так и на национальном уровне. При этом так и не возник никакой другой международный форум, который взял бы ответственность за управление все более глобализующейся мировой экономикой. Благодаря силам, которые способствовали росту эффективности управления «Группы двадцати», есть надежда, что будущие саммиты института продолжат положительную тенденцию. Следующий саммит состоится 28–29 июля 2019 г. в Осаке (Япония), в стране, которая никогда не становилась причиной глобального финансового кризиса, по-прежнему привержена принципам либерального миропорядка и становится все более экономически и даже демографически открытой в ответ на новые вызовы, с которыми сталкиваются и ее партнеры по институту. После испытания в 2020 г., когда председателем саммита будет Саудовская Аравия, страна с закрытой, контролируемой государством экономикой, в 2021 г. лидерство перейдет к демократической, экономически открытой Италии, а затем, в 2022 г., к Индии.

Ключевые слова: «Группа двадцати»; мировой порядок; глобальное управление; глобализация; торговля; изменение климата

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